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Optics Express

Optics Express

  • Editor: C. Martijn de Sterke
  • Vol. 19, Iss. 18 — Aug. 29, 2011
  • pp: 17729–17737

Time-cost analysis of a quantum key distribution system clocked at 100 MHz

X. F. Mo, I. Lucio-Martinez, P. Chan, C. Healey, S. Hosier, and W. Tittel  »View Author Affiliations

Optics Express, Vol. 19, Issue 18, pp. 17729-17737 (2011)

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We describe the realization of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system clocked at 100 MHz. The system includes classical postprocessing implemented via software, and is operated over a 12 km standard telecommunication dark fiber in a real-world environment. A time-cost analysis of the sifted, error-corrected, and secret key rates relative to the raw key rate is presented, and the scalability of our implementation with respect to higher secret key rates is discussed.

© 2011 OSA

OCIS Codes
(060.2330) Fiber optics and optical communications : Fiber optics communications
(060.5565) Fiber optics and optical communications : Quantum communications
(270.5568) Quantum optics : Quantum cryptography

ToC Category:
Quantum Optics

Original Manuscript: May 19, 2011
Revised Manuscript: June 23, 2011
Manuscript Accepted: June 23, 2011
Published: August 25, 2011

X. F. Mo, I. Lucio-Martinez, P. Chan, C. Healey, S. Hosier, and W. Tittel, "Time-cost analysis of a quantum key distribution system clocked at 100 MHz," Opt. Express 19, 17729-17737 (2011)

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