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Optics Express

Optics Express

  • Editor: Andrew M. Weiner
  • Vol. 21, Iss. 5 — Mar. 11, 2013
  • pp: 6304–6312
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Characteristics of superconducting single photon detector in DPS-QKD system under bright illumination blinding attack

Mikio Fujiwara, Toshimori Honjo, Kaoru Shimizu, Kiyoshi Tamaki, and Masahide Sasaki  »View Author Affiliations


Optics Express, Vol. 21, Issue 5, pp. 6304-6312 (2013)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1364/OE.21.006304


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Abstract

We derive the time-dependent photo-detection probability equation of a superconducting single photon detector (SSPD) to study the responsive property for a pulse train at high repetition rate. Using this equation, we analyze the characteristics of SSPDs when illuminated by bright pulses in blinding attack on a quantum key distribution (QKD). We obtain good agreement between expected values based on our equation and actual experimental values. Such a time-dependent probability analysis contributes to security analysis.

© 2013 OSA

1. Introduction

Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1

1. N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quantum cryptography,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 74(1), 145–195 (2002). [CrossRef]

] allows two users, Alice and Bob, to share random numbers with the unconditional security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics. BB84 [2

2. C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: public key distribution and coin tossing,” in International Conference on Computers Systems and Signal Processing (IEEE, 1984), pp.175–179. [CrossRef]

] is the most famous protocol of QKD. Recently QKD systems have been deployed in the field environment, and tested for their reliability [3

3. M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H. Ishizuka, W. Klaus, K. Wakui, M. Takeoka, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, Z. Wang, A. Tanaka, K. Yoshino, Y. Nambu, S. Takahashi, A. Tajima, A. Tomita, T. Domeki, T. Hasegawa, Y. Sakai, H. Kobayashi, T. Asai, K. Shimizu, T. Tokura, T. Tsurumaru, M. Matsui, T. Honjo, K. Tamaki, H. Takesue, Y. Tokura, J. F. Dynes, A. R. Dixon, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, A. J. Shields, S. Uchikoga, M. Legré, S. Robyr, P. Trinkler, L. Monat, J. B. Page, G. Ribordy, A. Poppe, A. Allacher, O. Maurhart, T. Länger, M. Peev, and A. Zeilinger, “Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD Network,” Opt. Express 19(11), 10387–10409 (2011). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

5

5. D. Stucki, M. Legre, F. Buntschu, B. Clausen, N. Felber, G. Gisin, L. Henzen, P. Junod, G. Litzistorf, P. Monbaron, L. Monat, J.-B. Page, D. Perroud, G. Ribordy, A. Rochas, S. Robyr, J. Tavares, R. Thew, P. Trinkler, S. Ventura, R. Voirol, N. Walenta, and H. Zbinden, “Long-term performance of the SwissQuantum quantum key distribution network in a field environment,” New J. Phys. 13(12), 123001 (2011). [CrossRef]

]. One should, however, note that unconditional security proofs assume that devices operate as required and their imperfections are within certain ranges as specified by the mathematical model. A gap between theory and practical implementation, i. e. side channels, can be reduced, but never vanishes. Protocols with simpler implementation are generally less vulnerable to side channels. Differential-phase-shift (DPS)-QKD protocol [6

6. K. Inoue, E. Waks, and Y. Yamamoto, “Differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution using coherent light,” Phys. Rev. A 68(2), 022317 (2003). [CrossRef]

, 7

7. T. Honjo, A. Uchida, K. Amano, K. Hirano, H. Someya, H. Okumura, K. Yoshimura, P. Davis, and Y. Tokura, “Differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution experiment using fast physical random bit generator with chaotic semiconductor lasers,” Opt. Express 17(11), 9053–9061 (2009). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

] has a simpler structure, especially in the receiver, which consists of an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer and two single photon detectors as in Fig. 1(a)
Fig. 1 (a) Conceptual view of DPS-QKD system. (b) Conceptual view and (c) equivalent circuit of the superconductor single photon detector (SSPD).
, and hence enables stable operation and long distance transmission. It has been applied for 90 km transmission with SSPDs [8

8. G. Gol'tsman, O. Okunev, G. Chulkova, A. Lipatov, A. Semenov, K. Smirnov, B. Voronov, A. Dzardanov, C. Williams, and R. Sobolewski, “Picosecond superconducting single-photon detector,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 79(6), 705–707 (2001). [CrossRef]

11

11. S. Miki, T. Yamashita, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, and Z. Wang, “Multi-channel SNSPD system with high detection efficiency at telecommunication wavelength,” Opt. Lett. 35(13), 2133–2135 (2010). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

] in the Tokyo QKD network [3

3. M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H. Ishizuka, W. Klaus, K. Wakui, M. Takeoka, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, Z. Wang, A. Tanaka, K. Yoshino, Y. Nambu, S. Takahashi, A. Tajima, A. Tomita, T. Domeki, T. Hasegawa, Y. Sakai, H. Kobayashi, T. Asai, K. Shimizu, T. Tokura, T. Tsurumaru, M. Matsui, T. Honjo, K. Tamaki, H. Takesue, Y. Tokura, J. F. Dynes, A. R. Dixon, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, A. J. Shields, S. Uchikoga, M. Legré, S. Robyr, P. Trinkler, L. Monat, J. B. Page, G. Ribordy, A. Poppe, A. Allacher, O. Maurhart, T. Länger, M. Peev, and A. Zeilinger, “Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD Network,” Opt. Express 19(11), 10387–10409 (2011). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

]. The SSPDs used there have very low dark count rates, and therefore they are suitable for a long distance QKD. Unfortunately, however, these detectors are threatened by detector side channel attacks.

Actually, eavesdropping by controlling single photon detectors (SPDs) have been proposed and demonstrated as mentioned later. In general, SPDs cannot count a photon number in the pulse, and they discriminate differential signals only, because SPDs are connected to amplifiers with capacitive coupling, and it follows that a user cannot know direct current level of SPDs. These facts imply that SPDs cannot distinguish between no-photon state and a state with no change which can be caused by continuously illuminating with bright input power beyond the normal operating range. Thus, it is possible to blind SPDs by bright continuous wave (CW) illumination. Moreover, semiconductor SPDs have “linear region” in which the output voltage from an SPD linearly increases with the power of very bright photo-illumination [12

12. L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010). [CrossRef]

, 13

13. L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 83(3), 032306 (2011). [CrossRef]

]. Such a characteristics enables intercept and resend attack [14

14. M. Curty and N. Lütkenhaus, “Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution protocol with weak coherent pulses,” Phys. Rev. A 71(6), 062301 (2005). [CrossRef]

], without being detected by Alice and Bob. Recently, hacking of commercial QKD systems by CW illumination superposed with strong pulses have been reported [13

13. L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 83(3), 032306 (2011). [CrossRef]

]. On the other hand, SSPDs do not have “linear region” of output voltage to input photo-power. To disguise the single photon counting event of SSPDs, attackers must revive superconductivity in SSPDs after the bright illumination blinding. That means sequential pulse illumination with well-calibrated modulation (bright and dark) should be illuminated to SSPDs. Indeed, hacking SSPDs in DPS-QKD system by bright illumination with tailored power-reduced pulses was proposed [15

15. L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011). [CrossRef]

] and demonstrated [16

16. T. Honjo, M. Fujiwara, K. Shimizu, K. Tamaki, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, H. Terai, Z. Wang, and M. Sasaki, “Countermeasure against tailored bright illumination attack for DPS-QKD,” Opt. Express 21(3), 2667–2673 (2013). [CrossRef]

]. In that case, the recovery time of SSPDs should be analyzed carefully. In general, the recovery times of SPDs in QKD systems are longer than pulse recurrence period of a QKD system. This is because it is difficult to develop a high rate SPD, and also the photo-detection rate is much smaller than photon transmission frequency due to the high attenuation in a transmission line and small photon number per pulse in QKD protocol. If the repetition period of the photo–detection is closer to the recovery time of a SPD, the detection efficiency changes according to history of photo-detection events. In addition, eavesdropping using pulse train named “sequential attack” [17

17. M. Curty, L.-L. Zhang, H.-K. Lo, and N. Lutkenhaus, “Sequential attack against differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution with weak coherent states,” Quantum Inf. Comp. 7, 665–688 (2007).

] was proposed against the DPS-QKD system, where the detection events are bunched as a result of the eavesdropping. To catch this attack, the users must monitor the correlations of the detection events. Hence it is necessary to characterize the behavior of an SSPD against a pulse train to study loophole of the QKD system with SSPDs.

In the experiment in Ref [15

15. L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011). [CrossRef]

], CW illumination with power of a few mW was used to blind SSPDs. Note that blinding attack with such strong power illumination can be detected easily, for instance by tapping 1% of optical pulses from a quantum channel and measuring the power of them. In this power measurement, Bob can detect the blinding attack using a commercial optical-power meter, if CW illumination with the power of mW region was used in the hacking. On the other hand, Honjo et al. [16

16. T. Honjo, M. Fujiwara, K. Shimizu, K. Tamaki, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, H. Terai, Z. Wang, and M. Sasaki, “Countermeasure against tailored bright illumination attack for DPS-QKD,” Opt. Express 21(3), 2667–2673 (2013). [CrossRef]

] demonstrated controlling SSPDs in the 1 GHz clocked DPS-QKD system and countermeasure against hacking by using pulse shaped bright illumination. They succeeded in decreasing the input optical-power to a few µW. However, it means that more than 10000 photons/pulse was needed to blind SSPDs. To know the behaviors of SSPDs in bright illumination is necessary to consider more effective way of bright illumination attack. In this paper, we discuss the equation of the photo-detection probability of our SSPDs to pulse train, and compare counting rate from the equation with experimental results. Such a consideration is useful for the effective hacking as well as countermeasure against bright illumination blinding attack on SSPDs.

2. Superconducting single photon detectors in our DPS-QKD system

Figure 1(b) and 1(c) show the conceptual view and equivalent circuit of our SSPD system. We have developed a multi-channel NbN SSPD system [10

10. S. Miki, M. Takeda, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, and Z. Wang, “Compactly packaged superconducting nanowire single-photon detector with an optical cavity for multichannel system,” Opt. Express 17(26), 23557–23564 (2009). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

, 11

11. S. Miki, T. Yamashita, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, and Z. Wang, “Multi-channel SNSPD system with high detection efficiency at telecommunication wavelength,” Opt. Lett. 35(13), 2133–2135 (2010). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

] based on the Gifford McMahon (GM) cryocooler that can offer guaranteed performance, be cryogen free, and be capable of turnkey, continuous operation with low input power consumption. There is a photograph of the SSPD system in the inset of on the left of Fig. 1(b). A superconductor nanowire has large inductance named kinetic inductance (Lk) in itself. We adopt a 50 Ω shunt resistance to suppress oscillation in the circuit shown in Fig. 1(b). The SSPD is biased with a current Ib slightly below the critical value Ic. An incident photon generates a resistive “hotspot” which disrupts the superconductivity across the wire, resulting in propagating a voltage pulse to the AC coupled amplifier. The output voltage pulse of ~Gain × Ib × RL is input to the discriminator, where Gain is the gain of the amplifier. When a pulse height exceeds the threshold voltage of discriminator, the system registers the detection of photons

Potential time constants which would limit recovery time of a SSPD are (1) thermal diffusion [18

18. A. D. Semenov, G. N. Gol’tsman, and R. Sobolewski, “Hot-electron effect in superconductors and its applications for radiation sensors,” Supercond. Sci. Tech. 15(4), R1–R16 (2002). [CrossRef]

], (2) time constant in the electrical circuit [19

19. A. J. Kerman, E. A. Dauler, W. E. Keicher, J. K. W. Yang, K. K. Berggren, G. Gol’tsman, and B. Voronov, “Kinetic-inductance-limited reset time of superconducting nanowire photon counters,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 88(11), 111116 (2006). [CrossRef]

], and (3) latching [20

20. A. J. Kerman, W. Yang, R. J. Molnar, E. A. Dauler, and K. K. Berggren, “Electrothermal feedback in superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors,” Phys. Rev. B 79(10), 100509 (2009). [CrossRef]

]. In these time constants, (2) limits our SSPD system dominantly. In our system, the thermal conductance in the SSPD is high enough compared to input optical power. In addition, our SSPDs with active area of 15 µm × 15 µm have Lk with 1-2 µH and such a large Lk decreases the probability of latching [20

20. A. J. Kerman, W. Yang, R. J. Molnar, E. A. Dauler, and K. K. Berggren, “Electrothermal feedback in superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors,” Phys. Rev. B 79(10), 100509 (2009). [CrossRef]

]. Thanks to such a large size, high coupling efficiency between a single mode fiber and an SSPD can be obtained. After the hotspot is formed, the superconducting current through it recovers with the time constant of Lk/RL, where RL is the load resistance (in our case: 25 Ω). Since our SSPDs are susceptible to electrical reflection due to the impedance mismatch, we use a shunt resistance with 50Ω shown in Fig. 1(b) to avoid electrical oscillation or reflection. In the counter measure against a CW illumination attack, monitoring photocurrent is very useful and demonstrated in Ref [21

21. Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 98(23), 231104 (2011). [CrossRef]

]. However, such a technique is not suitable for our system due to susceptibility to electrical oscillation. The current Ib which flows in the superconductor nanowire depends on the time as follows.
Ib=I0(1exp(RLLkt))=I0(1exp(βt),
(1)
where I0 is the initial bias current. The detection efficiency (η) depends on the bias current. Ref [19

19. A. J. Kerman, E. A. Dauler, W. E. Keicher, J. K. W. Yang, K. K. Berggren, G. Gol’tsman, and B. Voronov, “Kinetic-inductance-limited reset time of superconducting nanowire photon counters,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 88(11), 111116 (2006). [CrossRef]

] also investigated the time-dependence of the detection efficiency after the detection event by using optical pulse pair. Our goal in the future is to establish full quantum optical model of SSPDs, i.e., to obtain a full description of SSPD for positive operator valued measure (POVM) that can express a time dependent behavior for multiple photons. In the present work, we focus, as the first step, on studying the time dependent photo-detection probability for a pulse train. The standard model for the SSPD’s POVM is given as,
πoff=n=0(1η)n|nn|,
(2)
where πoff is the operator for no-detection event, |n> is for an n-photon state, and the detection operator is given πon = 1-πoff. In this equation, we must introduce the function η = η0*f(Ib), where η0 is the initial quantum efficiency. And f(Ib) which describes a relative quantum efficiency dependent on bias current can be obtained from experimental results illustrated by example in Fig. 2
Fig. 2 Quantum efficiency and dark count rate of the superconductor single photon detector (CH5) as functions of bias current. Bias current (Ib) is normalized by critical current (Ic).
. When we calculate f(Ib), some fitting curves are assigned according to Ib. Decrease of the practical bias current according to Eq. (1) induces the depression of the detection efficiency. Moreover, we have to consider the specific condition of the readout circuit of the SSPD.

3. The detection probability of SSPDs for a pulse train

In this section, the detection probability for the train with an interval of T is considered. The input signal is set in coherent state |α〉. The detection probability equation of an SPD for single event is described as “1-exp(-|α|2η)” in Ref [22

22. S. M. Barnett, L. S. Philips, and D. T. Pegg, “Imperfect photodetection as projection onto mixed states,” Opt. Commun. 158(1–6), 45–49 (1998). [CrossRef]

]. To obtain the detection probability for the pulse train considering the recovery time of an SSPD, we decompose the detection process: At first, the normal conductance transition probability Son of SSPD to pulse train is obtained as follows in a recursive way.
Soff(1T)=eγe|α|2η0Son(1T)=1Soff(1T)Soff(2T)=eγ{eγe|α|2η0e|α|2η0+(1Soff(1T))e|α|2η0f(I0(1exp(βT)))}Son(2T)=1Soff(2T)Soff(3T)=eγ{eγe2|α|2η0e|α|2η0+(1Soff(1T))eγ|α|2η0f(I0(1exp(βT)))e|α|2η0f(I0(1exp(2βT)))+(1Soff(2T))e|α|2η0f(I0(1exp(βT)))}Son(3T)=1Soff(3T)..........Soff(NT)=eNγeN|α|2η0+m=1N1{(1Soff((Nm)T))[k=1meγ|α|2η0f(I0(1exp(kβT)))]}Son(NT)=1Soff(NT),
(3)
where γ is the dark count probability of the SSPD, Soff (NT) and Son(NT) are the superconducting state probability and normal conductance state probability at a time slot of “NT”, respectively.

To recognize the photo-detection event in the SSPD system, RL × Ib(NT) × Gain must exceed threshold (Vth) of the discriminator. In our case the load resistance RL is 25Ω. Therefore, we have
Pon(NT)=Son(NT)g(NT)g(NT)=probability_of_(RL×Ib(NT)×GainVth)Poff(NT)=1Pon(NT),
(4)
where Pon(NT) is the photo-detection event probability at the time slot of “NT”. In our case, Vth is set around 8-40 m V. For example, Vth of CH5 is set 40 mV, and if I0 (initial bias current: 22.2 µA) is added to the detector, 55.5 mV pulse is generated at photon detection. The minimum Ib that can exceed Vth is about 72% of initial bias current (I0). At that bias current, the detection efficiencyη is 0.122% shown in Fig. 2. Note that we approximate g(NT) by Soff ((N-1)T) since this probability mostly affects the recovery of Ib.

4. Blinding SSPDs with pulse shaped illumination considering response time

Using these equations, behavior of the SSPD at blinding attack can be estimated. η, Lk and Ic of our SSPDs are listed in Table 1

Table 1. Characteristics of SSPDs.

table-icon
View This Table
. Figure 3
Fig. 3 Counting rate of SSPDs to pulse train of 1 GHz as functions of input power. Solid lines are experimental data and dashed lines are theoretical values from Eq. (4). Linear (a), and log (b) scale.
shows the counting rates as functions of input power of optical-pulse train of 300 ps width and 1 GHz repetition rate. Solid lines are experimental data and dashed lines are simulated values from Eq. (4). In the simulated curves, a cutoff rate of the discriminator in our setting was taken into account. In the figure, one can see the plateau in the counting rate about 66-70 M count/s, which is the maximum counting rate of the discriminator in our setup. And the simulated figures are in agreement with the experimental values, especially in the high power incident region. Note that it is important for the eavesdropper to know the input power needed to blind SSPDs with count rate below a few hundred, since this is approximately the same as dark count rate of SSPDs connected to the field installed fibers so that Alice and Bob would regard these counts as the dark counts. Figure 3 indicates that the SSPD with a relatively small Lk (CH5) requires input pulses of −30dBm to blind the SSPD with counting rate of a few hundred c/s. That means 8000 photons/pulse are necessary for blinding. And variation in Lk makes more than 3dB difference in the optical-power for the blinding.

5. Conclusion

In summary, we present an approach to obtain the equation which gives detection probability of SSPDs for a pulse train. A better understanding of the behavior under a pulse train, which our equation provides with us, is useful to consider an effective attack as well as countermeasure against bright illumination blinding attack to the QKD system. Such an analysis is necessary to dissect the security of the QKD system.

References and links

1.

N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quantum cryptography,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 74(1), 145–195 (2002). [CrossRef]

2.

C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: public key distribution and coin tossing,” in International Conference on Computers Systems and Signal Processing (IEEE, 1984), pp.175–179. [CrossRef]

3.

M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H. Ishizuka, W. Klaus, K. Wakui, M. Takeoka, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, Z. Wang, A. Tanaka, K. Yoshino, Y. Nambu, S. Takahashi, A. Tajima, A. Tomita, T. Domeki, T. Hasegawa, Y. Sakai, H. Kobayashi, T. Asai, K. Shimizu, T. Tokura, T. Tsurumaru, M. Matsui, T. Honjo, K. Tamaki, H. Takesue, Y. Tokura, J. F. Dynes, A. R. Dixon, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, A. J. Shields, S. Uchikoga, M. Legré, S. Robyr, P. Trinkler, L. Monat, J. B. Page, G. Ribordy, A. Poppe, A. Allacher, O. Maurhart, T. Länger, M. Peev, and A. Zeilinger, “Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD Network,” Opt. Express 19(11), 10387–10409 (2011). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

4.

M. Peev, C. Pacher, R. Alleaume, C. Barreiro, W. Boxleitner, J. Bouda, R. Tualle-Brouri, E. Diamanti, M. Dianati, T. Debuisschert, J. F. Dynes, S. Fasel, S. Fossier, M. Fuerst, J.-D. Gautier, O. Gay, N. Gisin, P. Grangier, A. Happe, Y. Hasani, M. Hentchel, H. Hübel, G. Humer, T. Länger, M. Legre, R. Lieger, J. Lodewyck, T. Lorünser, N. Lütkenhaus, A. Marhold, T. Matyus, O. Maurhart, L. Monat, S. Nauerth, J.-B. Page, E. Querasser, G. Ribordy, A. Poppe, L. Salvail, S. Robyr, M. Suda, A. W. Sharpe, A. J. Shields, D. Stucki, C. Tamas, T. Themel, R. T. Thew, Y. Thoma, A. Treiber, P. Trinkler, F. Vannel, N. Walenta, H. Weier, H. Weinfurter, I. Wimberger, Z. L. Yuan, H. Zbinden, and A. Zeilinger, “The SECOQC quantum key distribution network in Vienna,” New J. Phys. 11(7), 075001 (2009). [CrossRef]

5.

D. Stucki, M. Legre, F. Buntschu, B. Clausen, N. Felber, G. Gisin, L. Henzen, P. Junod, G. Litzistorf, P. Monbaron, L. Monat, J.-B. Page, D. Perroud, G. Ribordy, A. Rochas, S. Robyr, J. Tavares, R. Thew, P. Trinkler, S. Ventura, R. Voirol, N. Walenta, and H. Zbinden, “Long-term performance of the SwissQuantum quantum key distribution network in a field environment,” New J. Phys. 13(12), 123001 (2011). [CrossRef]

6.

K. Inoue, E. Waks, and Y. Yamamoto, “Differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution using coherent light,” Phys. Rev. A 68(2), 022317 (2003). [CrossRef]

7.

T. Honjo, A. Uchida, K. Amano, K. Hirano, H. Someya, H. Okumura, K. Yoshimura, P. Davis, and Y. Tokura, “Differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution experiment using fast physical random bit generator with chaotic semiconductor lasers,” Opt. Express 17(11), 9053–9061 (2009). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

8.

G. Gol'tsman, O. Okunev, G. Chulkova, A. Lipatov, A. Semenov, K. Smirnov, B. Voronov, A. Dzardanov, C. Williams, and R. Sobolewski, “Picosecond superconducting single-photon detector,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 79(6), 705–707 (2001). [CrossRef]

9.

A. Korneev, P. Kouminov, V. Matvienko, G. Chulkova, K. Smirnov, B. Voronov, G. N. Gol’tsman, M. Currie, W. Lo, K. Wilsher, J. Zhang, W. Słysz, A. Pearlman, A. Verevkin, and R. Sobolewski, “Sensitivity and gigahertz counting performance of NbN superconducting singlephoton detectors,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 84(26), 5338–5340 (2004). [CrossRef]

10.

S. Miki, M. Takeda, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, and Z. Wang, “Compactly packaged superconducting nanowire single-photon detector with an optical cavity for multichannel system,” Opt. Express 17(26), 23557–23564 (2009). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

11.

S. Miki, T. Yamashita, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, and Z. Wang, “Multi-channel SNSPD system with high detection efficiency at telecommunication wavelength,” Opt. Lett. 35(13), 2133–2135 (2010). [CrossRef] [PubMed]

12.

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010). [CrossRef]

13.

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 83(3), 032306 (2011). [CrossRef]

14.

M. Curty and N. Lütkenhaus, “Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution protocol with weak coherent pulses,” Phys. Rev. A 71(6), 062301 (2005). [CrossRef]

15.

L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011). [CrossRef]

16.

T. Honjo, M. Fujiwara, K. Shimizu, K. Tamaki, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, H. Terai, Z. Wang, and M. Sasaki, “Countermeasure against tailored bright illumination attack for DPS-QKD,” Opt. Express 21(3), 2667–2673 (2013). [CrossRef]

17.

M. Curty, L.-L. Zhang, H.-K. Lo, and N. Lutkenhaus, “Sequential attack against differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution with weak coherent states,” Quantum Inf. Comp. 7, 665–688 (2007).

18.

A. D. Semenov, G. N. Gol’tsman, and R. Sobolewski, “Hot-electron effect in superconductors and its applications for radiation sensors,” Supercond. Sci. Tech. 15(4), R1–R16 (2002). [CrossRef]

19.

A. J. Kerman, E. A. Dauler, W. E. Keicher, J. K. W. Yang, K. K. Berggren, G. Gol’tsman, and B. Voronov, “Kinetic-inductance-limited reset time of superconducting nanowire photon counters,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 88(11), 111116 (2006). [CrossRef]

20.

A. J. Kerman, W. Yang, R. J. Molnar, E. A. Dauler, and K. K. Berggren, “Electrothermal feedback in superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors,” Phys. Rev. B 79(10), 100509 (2009). [CrossRef]

21.

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 98(23), 231104 (2011). [CrossRef]

22.

S. M. Barnett, L. S. Philips, and D. T. Pegg, “Imperfect photodetection as projection onto mixed states,” Opt. Commun. 158(1–6), 45–49 (1998). [CrossRef]

OCIS Codes
(270.5570) Quantum optics : Quantum detectors
(270.5568) Quantum optics : Quantum cryptography

ToC Category:
Quantum Optics

History
Original Manuscript: January 15, 2013
Revised Manuscript: February 12, 2013
Manuscript Accepted: February 26, 2013
Published: March 5, 2013

Citation
Mikio Fujiwara, Toshimori Honjo, Kaoru Shimizu, Kiyoshi Tamaki, and Masahide Sasaki, "Characteristics of superconducting single photon detector in DPS-QKD system under bright illumination blinding attack," Opt. Express 21, 6304-6312 (2013)
http://www.opticsinfobase.org/oe/abstract.cfm?URI=oe-21-5-6304


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References

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  19. A. J. Kerman, E. A. Dauler, W. E. Keicher, J. K. W. Yang, K. K. Berggren, G. Gol’tsman, and B. Voronov, “Kinetic-inductance-limited reset time of superconducting nanowire photon counters,” Appl. Phys. Lett.88(11), 111116 (2006). [CrossRef]
  20. A. J. Kerman, W. Yang, R. J. Molnar, E. A. Dauler, and K. K. Berggren, “Electrothermal feedback in superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors,” Phys. Rev. B79(10), 100509 (2009). [CrossRef]
  21. Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography,” Appl. Phys. Lett.98(23), 231104 (2011). [CrossRef]
  22. S. M. Barnett, L. S. Philips, and D. T. Pegg, “Imperfect photodetection as projection onto mixed states,” Opt. Commun.158(1–6), 45–49 (1998). [CrossRef]

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